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Nietzsche and the Ideals of Modern Germany. By HERBERT LESLIE STEWART. Longmans, Green and Company, New York, 1915.—pp. xiv, 235.

This book does not pretend to be a thoroughgoing exposition and examination of Nietzsche's views; it confines itself "to those aspects of his work which may cast light upon the social policy and ideals of Germany as these have been revealed in the present war." "It is an effort to assist those who wish to correlate the moral outlook of Germany with one personal influence by which, beyond doubt, it has in part been directed." The author does not hold the prophet of Zarathustra responsible for the war; he thinks there has been a sinister aberration of thought on ethical questions, especially on the issues of international conduct in that country for the last thirty years, and he knows that Nietzsche is not the only writer who has given expression to revolutionary moral ideas. But he believes that this man "enforced with singular effectiveness just those doctrines of immoralism which Prussia has put into execution." Professor Stewart has not ignored those elements in Nietzsche's teaching which tended against racial aggressiveness and expressed contempt for German culture and German politics. He declares, however, that his points of agreement with militarism are far more significant than his points of dissent; he takes him "not as the originator of any policy, but as typical of a mood which has had fearful consequences for mankind." And he evidently believes that Nietzsche had a great deal to do with encouraging if not arousing this mood: "every one who knows Germany can testify what an idol Nietzsche is to a large and influential class"; "he is widely accepted as what he claims to be—the great ethical iconoclast who shattered forever the Christian values." Treitschke and Bernhardi, too, according to our author, exercised a great influence: the former was the historian of the Prussian government and "he has written what is received in Germany as the most discerning interpretation of his country's growth," while the latter minutely prophesied the precise grouping of the belligerents which has occurred and clearly foreshadowed Germany's tactics, three years before the war.

Professor Stewart puts his case cautiously and avoids the exaggerations into which many recent publicists have fallen in speaking of Nietzsche's share in the present European conflict. He admits that Nietzsche's message "may well have been a symptom quite as much as a cause of the militarist movement." There can be no doubt that some of the immoralist's ideas influenced some portions of the German

people; the only question is how potent this influence was, who were the persons affected by it, and what part of the teaching most appealed to them. Professor Stewart thinks this influence has been potent in a circle which is not without power in public affairs,—the middle class "which passes through the closely associated training of the University and the military corps." I doubt this, though I would not acquit Nietzsche of having contributed to the spread of pagan ideals among his people. The most important thing to be remembered,—and Professor Stewart does not forget it,—is that Nietzsche did not originate the kind of morality or immorality which is singled out as the predominating aspect of his doctrine. Individuals and nations had behaved in the Nietzschean spirit and thinkers had justified such behavior in theory long before this maker of aphorisms and paradoxes proclaimed the gospel of the will to power in books which at first nobody read. From the standpoint of private morality some of Frederick the Great's public acts were dastardly, and the principles determining Bismarck's politics, if practised in his individual dealings with his fellows, would have been pronounced reprehensible. Perhaps Nietzsche's immoralism "lent philosophical sanction to the selfishness and the unscrupulousness which had made his country successful in the past," as Professor Stewart thinks. It is true that any one can find justification for that type of conduct in Nietzsche's books: whatever may have been the writer's meaning, however we may try to refine it into something great and noble, there is no doubt that his philosophy can be made to justify the selfishness and unscrupulousness of any country. Nevertheless, Frederick and Bismarck and many others like them lived and have been glorified,—inside and outside of Germany,—long before this gentle Lutheran pastor's son thundered against Christianity and preached the superman. And *Realpolitik* is not a new thing in the world. The Germans did not originate it, even though their most admired Prussian king and their most admired Prussian statesman practised it with consummate skill. The German people learned to approve of the new politics because they succeeded and because they believed that the German states could never have been welded into an Empire by other methods than those employed by the man of "blood and iron," —a phrase, by the way, which has done quite as much to pervert political moral standards as the catchwords "manifest destiny" and "a place in the sun." No one who has lived in Germany needs to be told how deeply the new ideas sank into the German soul. Professor Th. Ziegler says in a book of his (*Die geistigen und sozialen Strömungen*

des 19. *Jahrhunderts*), after discussing the Schleswig-Holstein episode of 1864: "From these events we learned something else, something we had been able to learn only in a negative way in 1848: that in political affairs it is power that decides and not words and phrases, not agitations and revolutions. Bismarck, however, was such a man of power, action, will. In this sense, to be sure, the phrase "Might before right" was applicable to him. It is simply the truth, even though it is dangerous and may be sorely abused." Surely, there needed no Nietzsche to rise from his sickbed to preach the gospel of the will to power to influential circles in the fatherland: they had heard it long ago and had seen it put in practice with marvelous success;—and Frederick the Great already knew that pedants would not be wanting who would justify any practice of high politics on paper.

And it should be remembered also that Darwinism had a tremendous influence in Germany and that Nietzsche made this theory the basis of his new ethics, as General Bernhardi afterward made it the basis of his politics. The philosophy of selfishness and might has found in the theory of evolution a strong and useful ally, and the writers who have made use of it to "transvalue our values" are not confined to any one country. It is true, as Professor Stewart says, "the fault does not lie with Darwin; it lies with the smaller men who have caught up much of his language but little of his spirit." Still, the fact remains that the theory of evolution has been used to justify the blood-and-iron idea even in private morality, and that the principle of might has been applied in the business world and in political life, and often privately justified, by men who never read a page of Nietzsche. The remark attributed to President Roosevelt, that while Congress was debating the morality of the Panama Canal business, *he* took it, sounds suspiciously like Frederick the Great's phrase about the pedants; and the demand we frequently hear that the United States must eventually own all the territory down to the Panama Canal has the ring of the new or rather old politics. The opposition between the pagan ideal of power and the ideal of peace and good will is perhaps as old as the civilized race.

There can be no doubt on which side Nietzsche stood when he preached the superman. He cared more for the powerful individual than for the State because he regarded the State as a hindrance to the production of titanic personalities. But, in spite of his individualism and his opposition to a tutelary State, he glorified the great military conquerors; the ruthless warriors were his greatest individualists; his ideal was not civilization, which he thought to rest on

morality, but culture,—periods of history in which the great *Kraftmenschen* flourished and turned the old commonplace values on their heads. He did not believe in Germany's mission to be the teacher of all the peoples, as Fichte had taught; he had no more liking for her *Kultur* than for England's, looking upon France as the only cultivated nation of Europe; and he inclined to the notion of a European confederacy of States. But he believed in war, he glorified Napoleon, and there can be no doubt that he would have rejoiced in the coming of another such hero, whatever his nationality. He did not believe the Germans had the stuff in them or the social institutions necessary to produce that kind of man; he was not a chauvinist and he did not care who produced the superman; the superman is an end in himself and the value of a society is measured solely by its ability to give birth to such a being. He seems, however, to have had hopes of William II: "Our new Kaiser," he said in 1888, "pleases me more and more: his latest is that he has taken a very firm stand against Antisemitism and the Kreuzzeitung. . . . He would surely understand the will to power as a principle."

Nietzsche merely expressed in sensational form ideas that were not unknown either to theory or to practice. Little attention, however, was paid to him until 1888 when Professor Brandes of Copenhagen lectured on him; and Nietzsche never forgave his own countrymen for having passed him by. When the German professors began to study his books (after his mental breakdown), they certainly did not use him sparingly. They tried to deal justly with the valuable elements in his teaching: his impassioned opposition to hedonism, maudlin sympathy, and the dwarfing socialism that menaced the strong personalities; they praised his rigorism and his ideal of the development of the individual life, the very things which Professor Stewart with generous impartiality selects as worth while,—that is, not the new values but the true values which had always been prized by the sane thinkers of the race. But they strongly condemned his immoralism, his doctrine of the superman, his glorification of the blonde beast, his contempt for the common people, his antagonism to the modern State, and his hysterical attacks on Christianity. If any student left the University with any illusions as to the value of the Nietzschean thoughts, it was not the fault of the professors. A Nietzsche-cult did, however, gradually grow up outside of the universities, among young persons and among women, we are told. Professor Ziegler, in his book on Nietzsche, calls him the seductive ratcatcher of Hamelin of the youth, and declares that he influenced them through

his most paradoxical ideas: through his teaching of the superman in its most brutal form, and that Sudermann and Hauptmann, and even Wilbrandt and Spielhagen, had come under its spell.

These remarks are not urged in criticism of Professor Stewart's interesting and instructive book, but to emphasize some points which are often overlooked and the importance of which, I am sure, our author himself would be ready to admit. Professor Stewart is eminently fair both in his presentation of Nietzsche's views and in his estimate of them. He does not close his eyes to the valuable elements in the teaching, and his criticisms are invariably sensible and just. He cannot be accused of having cut the German immoralist's teaching to fit a desire to make out a bad case for Germany; he has simply tried to show that the *Herrenmoral* has been one of the causes of Germany's attitude in this war. Of this I am not sure; rather I am inclined to think that it would not have been different if there had been no Nietzsche.

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The Problem of Individuality. By HANS DRIESCH. New York, Macmillan & Co., 1914.—pp. vii, 84.

The four lectures which form this book epitomize Driesch's view of the biological, logical and metaphysical character of vitalism. They were delivered in England in 1913.

Biological science, Driesch says, must certainly allow the logical possibility that the unity and wholeness of an organism (its 'teleological' character) might be produced by purely mechanical processes, a mechanism being defined as "a given specific combination of specific chemical and physical agents" (p. 17). But this possibility is excluded by certain biological facts; *e. g.*, that in the blastula stage of the sea-urchin embryo a part of the embryo, cut at random, is capable of developing into a perfect adult. A random fragment of a true machine could not possibly be itself the complete machine. There certainly are "equipotential parts" in the early stage of the organism; but each develops differently in the actual ontogenesis, as may be required to realize the form of the adult. This selection of the appropriate, unity-forming development from among the several developments that were possible for a given part, can be shown not due to any simple difference of exterior local stimuli, nor to purely chemical processes inside the system. Some sort of non-mechanical "autonomy of life" is thus evidenced.

It is inconceivable, he continues, that a machine could be repeatedly